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Abstract: 
As the number of actors involved rises, the world of development assistance is becoming 
increasingly complicated. In recent years, most donors have therefore recognized the need for 
more coherent and better coordinated aid efforts to improve aid effectiveness and avoid 
overlaps and unnecessary duplication of efforts. This paper investigates the coherence and 
coordination of European Union (EU) development policies aimed at enhancing food and 
nutrition security. We find that although EU has shown great political commitment towards 
enhancing the coordination of development policies, progress has been limited. A quantitative 
assessment of the distribution of EU aid for food and nutrition security for the period between 
1995 and 2013, reveals that although the adoption of the Code of Conduct in 2007 appears to 
have set in motion a downward trend in the dispersion of aid - mostly through increased  
selectivity in terms of recipient countries – aid proliferation is still rampant. In addition, we 
find no evidence of improvements in terms of overlap between EU Institutions’ and Member 
States’ efforts.  
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Introduction 
As the number of actors involved rises, the world of development assistance is becoming 
increasingly complicated. A plethora of donors is now working in the same developing 
countries and in the same and expanding number of sectors, each pursuing their own policies 
and strategies. In recent years, most of them have therefore recognized the need for more 
coherent and better coordinated aid efforts to avoid overlaps and unnecessary duplication of 
efforts. Moreover, while the necessary quantity of aid has long been subject of scrutiny, 
increasingly attention is being shifted towards the quality of development assistance or aid 
effectiveness, which is likely to be influenced by the efficiency and thus the degree of 
coordination and complementarity of aid activities.  
The success of the Marshall Plan and aid programme in Taiwan in the 1950’s are for example 
often attributed to the fact that there was a single, large donor involved. In contrast, the OECD 
(2011) notes that today “many developing countries share a common problem: too little aid 
from too many donors”. As will become clear throughout this paper, it is often argued that in 
dealing with a multiplicity of donors with different conditionalities, procedures, languages, 
reporting guidelines and fiscal years, and projects, recipient countries face several problems 
including low country ownership, great administrative burdens and increased transaction 
costs.  
This paper aims to shed light on the coherence and coordination of European Union (EU) 
development policies aimed at enhancing food and nutrition security. Given its specific 
construction and the fact that both the EU and Member states are active in development 
cooperation, the EU has shown great political commitment towards enhancing the 
coordination of development policies. It has been noted however, that there appears to exist 
“a wide and persistent gap between the rhetoric of political declarations and the donors’ 
actual aid allocation” (Aldasoro et al., 2010). Moreover, as the global food price crisis 
revived interest in food and nutrition security and induced a rapid increase in donor funding 
for it, the need for improved coordination and complementarity of these particular aid flows 
increases.  
In line with Acharya et al. (2006), Dreher and Michaelowa (2010) we use the term 
“proliferation” to describe the patterns of donor distribution of aid flows and “fragmentation” 
to refer to the dispersion in the sources of aid received by recipient countries. While 
proliferation therefore focuses on the donor perspective, fragmentation describes the situation 
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from the perspective of an individual aid recipient. One distinct method to reduce aid 
fragmentation that has been underlined in several EU and international policy documents is 
concentrating aid efforts by reducing the number of partner countries or sectors in which 
donors are active. Bigsten (2006) however notes that donors tend to weigh global presence 
more heavily than aid effectiveness, thus making them reluctant to concentrate on fewer 
recipients. This paper will quantitatively assess the level of concentration or proliferation of 
EU Institutions and Member States’ aid for food and nutrition security and its evolution over 
time. In addition we will look at the complementarity of EU and Member State development 
policies in this area by quantitatively estimating the size of aid for food and nutrition security 
overlaps. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, we provide a review of the 
academic literature on aid coordination and complementarity as well as an overview of the 
different international and EU policy efforts aimed at enhancing coordination and 
complementarity. Next, we focus on aid for food and nutrition security in particular, and 
discuss the different EU development policies aimed at enhancing food and nutrition security. 
Finally, we quantitatively assess the degree of proliferation and overlap of EU aid for food 
and nutrition security.  
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1. Coordination and complementarity 
1.1  A review of the literature 
Today, recipients of development assistance interact with a multitude of donors, each with 
their own projects in a large and increasing number of economic sectors, requiring substantial 
time and effort by local high level staff and straining recipient country’s often weak 
bureaucracies. Moreover, the ever-growing number of actors involved in development 
cooperation continues to complicate the coordination process (Nunnenkamp et al., 2013).  
The fact that aid is flowing through (too) many channels is commonly argued to give rise to 
high transaction costs within each recipient country. Other concerns include the lack of 
critical mass, failure to develop comparative advantages or finding and exploiting a niche and 
collective action problems such as tragedy of the commons, moral hazard and free rider 
problems, which tend to undermine the quality of governance or retard the development of 
public sector capacity (Munro, 2005; Knack and Rahmann, 2007). One example of these 
collective action problems is that with many donors present, responsibilities become blurred 
(Dreher and Michaelowa, 2010). Acharya et al. (2006) further add that a diversity of aid 
channels makes it easier for national-level government officials and politicians to protect their 
vested interests. Finally, it has been argued that aid proliferation imposes costs on donors as 
well, since it prevents them from benefitting from economies of scale (Anderson, 2012). 
Bigsten et al. (2011) estimate for the EU and Member States that reducing the number of 
partner countries by 37 per cent (one standard deviation) would reduce yearly administrative 
costs for donors by 20 per cent, or 500 million EUR in 2009 prices. The same estimation for 
all DAC country donors results in a saving of 856 million USD in 2009 prices (Bigsten and 
Tengstam, 2015). Shifting from project support towards more (66% of country programmable 
aid) programme based approaches is estimated to save DAC country donors and the EU 
another 984 million USD and 300 million EUR in administration costs (Bigsten et al., 2011: 
Bigsten and Tengstam, 2015). 
Several studies however, point to a persistent lack of donor coordination. The emerging 
evidence on donor herding (e.g. Frot and Santiso, 2011; Davies and Klasen, 2013) - when 
donors increase their aid effort in line with the efforts of other donors - provides an important 
indication that donors are not coordinating. In addition, there is substantial evidence 
documenting high and increasing levels of aid fragmentation and donor proliferation. Based 
on their calculations of a measure of specialization of aid flows in 2004, Easterly and Pfutze 
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(2008) conclude that “the aid effort is splintered among many different donors, each agency's 
aid effort is splintered among many different countries, and each agency's aid effort is also 
splintered among many different sectors”. Frot and Santiso (2010) measure and compare 
project proliferation in aid sectors in 2007 and find that as a consequence of the major shift 
towards social sectors, these are the most fragmented. Easterly and Williamson (2011) 
conclude that donors are very far from efficient behaviour on specialization and that despite 
several reform efforts fragmentation was still rampant in 2008. Aldasoro et al. (2010) 
similarly find that there exists a wide gap between the rhetoric of political declarations and the 
degree of coordination of actual aid flows for the period between 1995 and 2006. 
Nunnenkamp et al. (2013) measure donor specialization and overlap between 1998 and 2009 
and demonstrate that donor proliferation persisted and even increased.  
When looking into possible determinants of increased fragmentation, Acharya et al. (2006) 
demonstrate that between 1999 and 2001 aid recipients experiencing the most extreme 
fragmentation were very likely to be aided by the worst proliferators among donors. Oh and 
Kim (2015) confirm these results for a larger sample covering a fifty year period starting from 
1960 and additionally demonstrate that donors tend to proliferate as they have more budget. 
Nunnenkamp et al. (2013) show results that suggest that a rising share of debt relief and 
general budget support are associated with lower proliferation indices. Using a large panel 
dataset covering the period from 1961 to 2011, Fuchs et al. (2015) also reveal that export 
competition between donors is a major impediment to aid coordination. 
As mentioned above, it is assumed that the effectiveness of aid is severely hampered by this 
donor proliferation, aid fragmentation and lack of coordination. Birdsall (2005) even refers to 
the latter as one of the seven “deadly sins” of aid delivery. Djankov et al. (2009) and Kimura 
et al. (2012) provide empirical support for the hypothesis that aid proliferation has a negative 
effect on economic growth in recipient countries, especially in Africa. Munro (2005) however 
argues for a more nuanced view as “the relationship between focus and aid effectiveness is 
almost certainly not simple or linear”. In line with this argument, Oh and Kim (2015) find 
that the relationship between aid fragmentation and GDP per capita growth takes on the shape 
of a concave upward parabola, suggesting that there might exist a threshold after which 
diseconomies of scale relating to transaction costs outweigh the advantages of pluralism and 
competition.  
Surprisingly few empirical studies investigate the supposed link with increased transaction 
costs and dysfunctional bureaucratic and political behaviour. The available evidence however 
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shows support for the hypothesized adverse effects of aid fragmentation. Knack and Rahman 
(2007) construct indices of aid fragmentation across donors based on annual aid 
disbursements and the number of aid projects and show that these are associated with 
deteriorated bureaucratic quality between 1982 and 2001. Djankov et al. (2009) similarly find 
that fragmentation is associated with increased corruption in the recipient country’s 
government. Anderson (2012) also finds that aid fragmentation tends to raise donors’ 
transaction costs. Finally, the concern that reducing aid fragmentation will give rise to more 
tying of aid as it could lead to increased monopoly power for donors is negated by the 
findings presented by Knack and Smets (2013). Their results even indicate that an increase in 
the donor share of total aid is associated with a decline in the proportion of tied aid.  
 
1.2  EU and global policies aimed at enhancing coordination and 
complementarity 
As mentioned above, donor coordination has received high level political attention, especially 
in recent years, and the donor community in general, and the European Union in particular, 
has undertaken several efforts to reduce proliferation and increase coordination (see Figure 1).  
Figure 1 : EU and global policies aimed at enhancing coordination and complementarity - Timeline 
 
 
Given its specific construction and the fact that both the EU and Member states are active in 
development cooperation, the European Union has paid considerable attention to the 
coordination of development policies. Already in a Memorandum from 1972 for example, the 
Commission recognized the crucial importance of coherence and coordination for the 
effectiveness of aid and issued guidelines aimed at strengthening coordination between 
national and Community policies (EC, 1972). While in the following years several other 
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proposals were made, including “concerted action at sectoral level” and “coordination of 
operations in connection with specific projects and programmes”, these did not translate into 
concrete steps (Delputte, 2013). The Treaty of Maastricht (1992), provided a legal basis for 
development policy and established the principles of coordination and complementarity. 
Hoebink (2004) however notes that “because there were much more important issues at stake, 
because the negotiating process was long and hard on most of these issues, the three C’s 
(coordination, complementarity and coherence) slipped more or less unattended into the final 
text of the Treaty of Maastricht”. Moreover, the text is cast in rather general terms. 
After the 2002 Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, aid effectiveness 
came to the forefront of the policy debate and the Monterrey Consensus includes a clear 
commitment towards improving the coordination of aid (UN, 2003). In the 2003 Rome 
Declaration on Harmonization, members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
again expressed their concern about unproductive transaction costs and agreed to facilitate 
harmonization (OECD/DAC, 2003). Perhaps the most important milestone in this political 
quest for more aid effectiveness and improved coordination however, was reached in 2005 
with the Paris Declaration (2005). Amongst other things, the latter serves as an explicit 
agreement between donor and recipient countries to improve coordination. The declaration 
clearly states that “excessive fragmentation of aid at global, country or sector level impairs 
aid effectiveness” and calls for “a pragmatic approach to the division of labour and burden 
sharing” to increase complementarity and reduce transaction costs. While donors are urged to 
specialise in areas where they have a comparative advantage, within the Paris Declaration’s 
call for harmonization and coordination, the focus lies more on the harmonization of rules and 
procedures, the development of new instruments to pool resources, and increased shared 
analysis, rather than increased specialization and clear division of labour.  
Though generally overlooked, it is important to acknowledge the decisive contribution of the 
EU (Carbone, 2012). The Paris Declaration, and in particular the sections on donor 
coordination, largely reflected the EU’s common position that was based on a series of 
practical recommendations issued in 2004. With the adoption of the European Consensus on 
Development that same year, the EU further underlined its dedication to enhancing aid 
effectiveness by improving coordination and complementarity by committing to taking a lead 
role in implementing the Paris Declaration and making four additional commitments; to 
provide all capacity building assistance through coordinated programmes with an increasing 
use of multi-donors arrangements; to channel 50 % of government-to-government assistance 
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through country systems, including by increasing the percentage of our assistance provided 
through budget support or sector-wide approaches; to avoid the establishment of any new 
project implementation units; to reduce the number of un-coordinated missions by 50 %. As a 
follow-up, the EU adopted a Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour 
in 2007. With principles that include focussing on a limited number of priority countries and a 
maximum of three sectors in each partner country in line with donors’ comparative 
advantages, the code of Conduct is considered as “the most demanding normative framework 
on Division of Labour so far” (Burcky, 2011). In the run-up to the forum on aid effectiveness 
in Accra in 2008, the EU also launched the Fast Track Initiative on Division of Labour and 
Complementarity (FTI DoL), supporting a selected number of developing countries in the 
process of implementing in-country division of labour.  
The impact of the EU was in turn evident in the Accra Agenda for Action (2008). In 
particular, the Agenda aims to achieve reduced aid fragmentation by “improving the 
complementarity of donors’ efforts and the division of labour among donors, including 
through improved allocation of resources within sectors, within countries, and across 
countries”. The International Good Practice Principles for Country-Led Division of Labour 
and Complementarity were finalised the following year, and again largely reflected the 
principles adopted by the EU earlier (Carbone, 2012) as they underline the importance of 
partner country leadership in guiding donors towards focussing their support on a limited 
number of sectors or areas in which they can deliver high quality aid (OECD, 2009).  
Despite this strong political commitment to improving aid effectiveness through enhancing 
coordination and focussing on complementarity, the 2011 report monitoring the 
implementation of the Paris Declaration concludes that there was limited progress with regard 
to the use of programme-based approaches and the coordination of donor missions and 
analytic works and the implementation of division of labour exercises at the country level has 
been relatively slow. The report further indicates that most efforts by donors to reduce the 
burden of aid management for partner countries have not had a significant impact (OECD, 
2012). The third FTI DoL Monitoring Survey however argues that there have been 
improvements since 2008 and encouraging results in some important areas, including the 
widespread use and institutionalization of donor mappings, an upward trend in country-level 
agreement on sector definitions and solid use of lead donor arrangements (Wentzel et al., 
2011).  
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2. EU development policy aimed at enhancing food and 
nutrition security  
In the aftermath of the global food price crisis, the European Union and its Member States 
underlined the importance of combatting hunger and aimed to materialize their leadership in 
the global food security agenda, by endorsing An EU policy framework to assist developing 
countries in addressing food security challenges2 (COM(2010) 127).  
The framework urges the EU to focus on those food insecure countries that are most off-track 
in reaching MDG1 - in particular in Africa, but also South Asia and countries in fragile 
situations - and concentrate on smallholder farmers and vulnerable communities. The 
framework is based on four pillars:  
i. increasing availability of food (through sustainable small-scale food production); 
ii. improving access to food (by applying a "Right-to-Food" approach and enhancing 
employment opportunities and social transfer mechanisms); 
iii. improving nutritional adequacy of food intake;  
iv. enhancing crisis prevention and management in developing countries.  
More specifically the EU and its Member States committed to prioritize smallholder 
agricultural development, governance, regional integration, and assistance mechanisms for 
vulnerable populations.  
To maximize the effectiveness of these interventions, the policy framework stresses the 
importance of alignment with national and regional policies on agriculture and food security. 
The framework further specifically states that the EU approach to food security in developing 
countries needs to be anchored in the principles of the Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda 
and the EU DoL. In particular, the EU and its Member States should identify regions and 
countries where tasks will be divided based on comparative advantage and coordinate actions 
under the guidance of a lead donor. 
Recurrent crises in the Sahel region and in the Horn of Africa inspired the Commission’s 
proposal for The EU approach to resilience: Learning from food security crises (COM 
(2012) 586 final). This communication underlines the need to work on a long-term and 
systematic approach to building resilience and focuses on tackling the root causes of food 
                                                          
2 This communication was complemented by a communication on humanitarian food assistance, which focuses 
on emergency and post-emergency context and therefore falls outside the scope of this paper. 
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insecurity rather than addressing the consequences. The document clearly states that 
enhancing resilience requires “alleviating the underlying causes conducive to crises as well as 
enhancing capacities to better manage future uncertainty and change”. The three components 
to the approach are: 
i. anticipating crises by assessing risk;   
ii. focusing on prevention and preparedness;  
iii. enhancing the response to crisis.   
Moreover, in line with the emerging consensus on the importance of nutrition, the term “food 
and nutrition security” replaced food security and the policy framework was complemented 
with a specific nutrition policy framework Enhancing maternal and child nutrition in 
external assistance (COM(2013) 141 final). The EU promotes a multi-sector approach to 
address the various determinants of undernutrition combining sustainable agriculture, rural 
development, food and nutrition security, public health, water and sanitation, social protection 
and education. The Commission identified the following strategic priorities: 
i. enhance mobilization and political commitment for nutrition (through political 
dialogue and advocacy at the country level and working towards greater 
harmonization and coherence and a more effective international response); 
ii. scale up actions at country level (by strengthening human and institutional/system 
capacity; increasing interventions specifically designed for nutrition in humanitarian 
and development settings and increasing nutrition-sensitive actions in humanitarian 
and development settings); 
iii. strengthening the expertise and the knowledge base for nutrition (through investing in 
applied research and support information systems and providing technical expertise 
and assistance). 
To reinforce and operationalize the EU commitments an implementation plan Boosting food 
and nutrition security through EU action: Implementing our commitments (SWD (2013) 
104 final) followed in 2013. As the first draft already saw light in 2011, the formulation of 
this implementation plan proved to be a cumbersome process. Possible reasons for this 
unusual delay include a number of policy shifts including the focus on nutrition and a lack of 
political drive from the Member States (Engel et al., 2013). The implementation plan defines 
six policy priorities that are accompanied by specific performance criteria and indicative 
intervention areas:  
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i. improving smallholder resilience and rural livelihoods; 
ii. supporting effective governance; 
iii. supporting regional agriculture and food and nutrition security policies; 
iv. strengthening social protection mechanisms for food and nutrition security, 
particularly for vulnerable population groups; 
v. enhancing nutrition in particular for mothers, infants and children; and 
vi. enhancing coordination between development and humanitarian actors to build 
resilience and promote sustainable food and nutrition security. 
It is interesting to note however, that the main performance criteria consist of the number and 
value of relevant programmes rather than actual food and nutrition security outcomes. 
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3. Measuring EU aid for food and nutrition security 
coordination and complementarity 
We will base our analysis of coordination and complementarity of EU aid for food and 
nutrition security on data on aid activities derived from the OECD/DAC Creditor Reporting 
System (CRS). For the purpose of this paper, we define aid for food and nutrition security in a 
broad sense and distinguish it from humanitarian or emergency food assistance. Extending the 
OECD (2012) definition of aid for food and nutrition security and in line with the working 
definition of aid for FNS used by the G8 L’Aquila Food Security Initiative (AFSI, 2012), we 
consider all aid reported under agriculture, agro-industries, fishing, basic nutrition3, basic 
drinking water supply4 and sanitation5, rural development and developmental food aid/food 
security assistance. 
We will largely focus our discussion on commitments, as these are available for a longer time 
period and Mürle (2007), Dreher and Michaelowa (2010) and Aldasoro et al. (2010) underline 
that these data are better suited for a forward-looking analysis as they are closer to current 
policies. Results of calculations based on data on disbursements are reported in Appendix A. 
To account for the fact that aid allocations exhibit large year-to-year fluctuations, our main 
analysis is based on average commitments over the sub-periods 1995-1997, 1998-2001, 2002-
2005, 2006-2009 and 2010-2013. Results of calculations based on yearly data can be found in 
Appendix B. 
 
3.1 Fragmentation and proliferation  
Based on data on disbursements, as these are more appropriate for assessing the current 
situation rather than to plan future activities (Dreher and Michaelowa, 2013), we take a first 
glance at the dispersion of aid for food and nutrition security in 2013. The EU institutions 
disbursed aid for food and nutrition security to no less than 116 developing countries in 2013. 
                                                          
3 “Basic nutrition” covers direct feeding programmes, determination of micro-nutrient deficiencies, provision of 
vitamin A, iodine, iron etc., monitoring of nutritional status, nutrition and food hygiene education, household 
food security. 
4 “Basic drinking water supply” covers rural water supply schemes using hand pumps, spring catchments, 
gravity-fed systems, rainwater collection and fog harvesting, storage tanks, small distribution systems typically 
with shared connections/points of use and urban schemes using hand pumps and local neighbourhood networks 
including those with shared connections. 
5 “Basic sanitation” covers latrines, on-site disposal and alternative sanitation systems, including the promotion 
of household and community investments in the construction of these facilities. 
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Germany and France in turn are reported to have been involved in 96 and 79 countries 
respectively and more than 65 per cent of recipient countries of EU aid for food and nutrition 
security were dealing with at least 5 EU donors in this area alone. In the first Biennial Report 
on Implementing EU Food and Nutrition Security Policy Commitments, the Commission 
notes that “there may be opportunities for EU donors to operate more efficiently”, as 
according to their calculations 68 partner countries received less than EUR 3 million on 
average per donor, with the problem being particularly striking in Central America (EC, 
2014). The latter can be derived from Figure 2, depicting the total amount of EU development 
assistance for food and nutrition security received and the corresponding number of EU 
donors (Member States and Institutions) for all recipient countries in 2013. From the map we 
can immediately see that in many cases the large number of EU donors cannot solely be 
explained by larger total receipts of aid for food and nutrition security. Take for example 
South Africa, which is by no means an important recipient of aid for food and nutrition 
security in terms of total volume, yet the country received assistance from 12 different EU 
donors in 2013.  
Figure 2: Mapping the dispersion of EU ODA for FNS in 2013 
 
Source : OECD/DAC CRS (2015) 
While easily calculated and interpreted, the simple count of donors and recipients does not 
take into account important aspects of aid dispersion including cross-sector proliferation. In 
what follows we will therefore base our discussion on a more detailed and comprehensive 
measure of aid proliferation. In particular, we will follow the methodology developed by 
Aldasoro et al. (2010) and Nunnenkamp et al. (2013) and calculate a Theil index of 
concentration that captures both the recipient country and sector dimension:  
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(1) P = - ∑ ∑ (𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠 ∗ ln�𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠�)𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠=1𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1                  
Where 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠 stands for share of aid in sector s to recipient i and n and m stand for the total number of recipient 
countries and sectors respectively. 
This proliferation index will range from ln(1) or zero, which corresponds to the case where all 
aid goes to one sector in one particular country, to ln (n*m), when aid for food and nutrition 
security is distributed evenly among m (=7) different sectors and n (=180) recipients. 
Figure 3: Concentration index EU ODA for FNS (commitments) 
 
Source : Author’s calculations 
The Theil indices of proliferation across both sectors and recipients for the four year averages 
of aid for food and nutrition security are reported in Columns (I) of Table 1 and depicted in 
Figure 3. On average for the entire period (1995-2013), Germany stands out as the worst 
proliferator, followed by Belgium and France. The case of Belgium is particularly striking, as 
the country’s total aid for food security budget is rather modest.  For the period between 2009 
and 2013, France is the worst proliferator as Germany appears to have increased its focus 
considerably.  
Although modest improvements have been made in recent years, the European Commission 
itself is far from concentrated in its provision of aid for food and nutrition security. Of course 
this has to be nuanced, given the fact that the total aid budget is considerably larger compared 
to any of the Member States since throughout this period over one third of total EU aid for 
food and nutrition security was channelled through EU Institutions. 
In general, the average level of proliferation among the traditional EU bilateral donors has 
been declining for the last two periods. Looking at the yearly data, we note that proliferation 
was largely increasing from 1996 up until 2007, after which modest improvements have been 
made. In 2013 however, there appears to have been an upsurge for most Member States. At 
the same time, EU enlargement has prompted the establishment of several new donors, who 
are still expanding their portfolios and therefore increasingly proliferating.  
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Table 1 allows us to further decompose these results and assess how the country and sector 
dimensions contribute to overall aid proliferation, as the concentration index based on total 
aid for food security informs us on the recipient country dimension (columns II), while the 
index based on sector-specific aid for food and nutrition security to all developing countries 
describes cross-sector proliferation (columns III). It is important to note that the two sub-
indices should not be compared directly as they have different maximum values, 
corresponding to the logarithm of the total number of sectors (7) and recipient countries (180) 
respectively.   
Table 1: Concentration Indexa ODA for FNS Commitments 
 
1995-1997 1998-2001 2002-2005 2006-2009 2010-2013 
 I II III I II III I II III I II III I II III 
Austria 1.46 2.99 1.28 3.03 2.91 1.32 3.57 3.00 1.30 3.54 2.95 1.32 3.37 3.05 0.97 
Belgium 3.64 3.82 0.99 3.53 3.67 1.22 4.30 3.53 1.18 3.92 3.27 1.15 3.30 3.14 0.90 
Czech Rep.             1.79 2.24 0.67 
Denmark 2.93 2.80 1.21 3.07 2.71 0.84 3.34 2.90 1.20 2.81 2.42 1.48 2.51 2.77 0.85 
Estonia             0.36 0.05 0.00 
Finland 1.79 2.06 1.10 3.03 2.45 1.30 2.89 2.43 1.15 2.98 2.68 1.20 2.68 3.00 1.24 
France 3.09 3.18 1.32 3.79 3.27 0.79 4.01 3.58 1.20 4.03 3.60 0.77 3.60 3.49 1.13 
Germany 2.76 3.28 1.26 4.11 3.82 1.31 4.77 4.02 1.29 4.57 3.86 1.35 3.15 3.71 1.36 
Greece       3.41 2.91 1.18 3.11 2.73 1.39 1.34 1.50 0.15 
Ireland   
 
1.83 2.61 1.19 3.96 2.96 1.39 3.38 2.84 1.39 2.74 2.78 1.31 
Italy 1.83 3.19 1.06 1.91 3.68 1.06 4.21 3.75 1.52 4.20 3.73 1.20 3.54 3.43 1.23 
Luxembourg   
 
0.57 0.96 0.43 2.64 2.42 1.24 3.71 3.05 1.58 2.50 2.83 1.48 
Netherlands 2.55 3.40 1.34 4.29 3.73 1.49 3.59 2.99 1.21 3.57 3.09 1.20 2.43 2.67 1.24 
Poland             0.60 1.75 0.95 
Portugal 0.51 0.43 0.43 2.10 1.71 0.54 2.16 1.60 0.58 2.08 1.43 0.78 2.18 1.79 1.20 
Slovak Rep.             0.64 1.17 0.50 
Slovenia             1.14 1.53 1.00 
Spain 1.93 2.01 1.62 3.95 3.37 1.59 4.52 3.39 1.60 4.58 3.60 1.65 3.09 3.48 1.36 
Sweden 1.98 2.24 1.16 3.39 2.90 1.32 3.08 2.84 1.26 3.29 3.00 1.14 2.69 2.65 1.03 
UK 2.86 3.22 1.32 3.59 2.92 1.46 3.71 3.13 1.32 2.89 2.46 1.38 2.53 3.08 1.54 
    
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 EU Inst. 1.10 3.91 1.14 2.42 3.91 1.24 4.48 4.05 1.44 4.40 4.00 1.26 3.58 3.71 1.31 
a See text for details of calculation.  
Columns (I): based on sector-specific ODA for FNS to individual recipient countries; Columns (II): based on 
total ODA for FNS to individual recipient countries; Columns (III): based on sector-specific ODA for FNS to 
all recipient countries. 
It appears that most progress has been made in terms of selectivity in choosing recipient 
countries. On average, the index for cross-country proliferation has been declining largely 
since 2005. It is interesting that we find rather different results across both dimensions for 
some donors. Belgium for example is one of the worst proliferators in terms of recipient 
countries, while the country has been rather focused in terms of sectors. Ireland on the 
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contrary, appears to make up for what it lacks in sector focus by its selectivity in terms of 
recipient countries. 
3.2 Overlap  
It can be argued that while perhaps a necessary condition, specialization or concentration of 
aid does not guarantee better coordination as donors could favour the same (smaller number 
of) countries and sectors giving rise to overlapping activities. Moreover, given the importance 
of the concept of “complementarity” in EU policy on development cooperation, we are in 
particular interested in measuring the coordination between the EU and Member States. 
Consider Germany, a donor disbursing aid for food and nutrition security to 86 of the same 
developing countries that the EU Institutions were aiding. Moreover, in 83 cases, both donors 
were active in the same sector(s) as well. Though, this doesn’t necessarily imply that German 
and EU Institutions’ development assistance for food and nutrition security is 
uncomplimentary, it at least suggests that there might be some overlap.  
To get a more detailed, quantitative sense of the overlap between EU Institutions and Member 
States development policies aimed at enhancing food and nutrition security, we compare the 
structure of their aid. In the spirit of the EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and 
Division of Labour in Development Policy, which focuses both on cross-country and cross-
sector complementarity, and in line with Aldasoro et al. (2010) and Nunnenkamp et al. 
(2013), we will again consider both the recipient country and sector dimension to allow for 
the possibility that coordination may take the form of the Member States engaging in a 
different sub-set of countries or alternatively focusing on different sectors.  
(2) 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑑𝑑1, 𝑑𝑑2 =  ∑ ∑ 𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀 (𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑1 ;  𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠=1𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑2 )   
With 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = share of aid from donor j in sector s to recipient i and n and m stand for the total number of recipient countries 
and sectors respectively. 
This index varies from 0, in the case of no overlap between donors to 1 when the composition 
of the aid budget is completely the same.  
Figure 4 and columns I of Table 2 show the overlaps between the 4 year average 
commitments of aid for food and nutrition security from the different Member States and the 
EU Institutions respectively. Similar to what we found with regards to proliferation, on 
average for the entire period, Germany appears to have most overlapping aid activities with 
the EU Institutions and is closely followed by France. For both countries, the similarities with 
the EU Institutions composition of aid for food and nutrition security were particularly large 
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before 2005 and have declined modestly afterwards. Overall, we find that overlap between the 
average EU and the majority Member States commitments of aid for food and nutrition 
security has decreased for the period between 2010 and 2013. For Denmark however, there 
was a sharp increase and of course overlap between the EU and the emerging donors from the 
New Member States has been rising as well. In addition, when looking at the yearly estimates 
there is no real discernible downward sloping trend. We find that overlap with the EU 
Institutions in fact peaked in the aftermath of the global food price crisis and has been on the 
rise again since 2012. This seems to suggest that increasing policy attention and funding for 
food and nutrition security goes hand in hand with more overlapping aid activities and 
therefore perhaps the duplication of efforts.  
Figure 4: Overlap index EU ODA for FNS (commitments) 
 
Source : Author’s calculations 
Columns II and III in Table 2 present overlap indices for the distribution of aid for food and 
nutrition security along the dimension of recipient countries and sectors respectively. We 
again note that the two sub-indices should not be compared directly as the likelihood of 
having a similar distribution across 7 sectors is considerably higher compared to 180 recipient 
countries.  
Table 2: Overlap Indexa ODA for FNS Commitments 
 
1995-1997 1998-2001 2002-2005 2006-2009 2010-2013 
 I II III I II III I II III I II III I II III 
Austria 0.03 0.09 0.57 0.08 0.09 0.53 0.08 0.16 0.59 0.13 0.14 0.56 0.11 0.16 0.81 
Belgium 0.09 0.24 0.40 0.14 0.14 0.51 0.13 0.23 0.57 0.14 0.13 0.74 0.14 0.14 0.76 
Czech Rep.             0.05 0.04 0.71 
Denmark 0.05 0.08 0.31 0.05 0.05 0.29 0.07 0.15 0.43 0.09 0.10 0.65 0.15 0.17 0.79 
Estonia             0.01 0.00 0.54 
Finland 0.03 0.04 0.46 0.10 0.06 0.46 0.08 0.09 0.52 0.07 0.06 0.55 0.11 0.12 0.83 
France 0.07 0.19 0.44 0.14 0.13 0.43 0.22 0.19 0.59 0.18 0.18 0.73 0.17 0.17 0.85 
Germany 0.06 0.16 0.48 0.18 0.18 0.49 0.19 0.23 0.57 0.19 0.14 0.72 0.19 0.19 0.87 
Greece       0.09 0.10 0.52 0.12 0.10 0.72 0.02 0.01 0.57 
Ireland    0.04 0.11 0.46 0.19 0.17 0.61 0.16 0.13 0.80 0.15 0.13 0.82 
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Italy 0.03 0.16 0.74 0.06 0.16 0.85 0.16 0.16 0.69 0.19 0.14 0.95 0.18 0.15 0.89 
Luxembourg    0.01 0.01 0.32 0.09 0.16 0.63 0.11 0.15 0.62 0.07 0.25 0.77 
Netherlands 0.06 0.15 0.49 0.15 0.17 0.48 0.12 0.15 0.52 0.17 0.12 0.55 0.11 0.08 0.87 
Poland             0.03 0.03 0.82 
Portugal 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.01 0.02 0.29 0.03 0.05 0.36 0.02 0.03 0.71 0.02 0.06 0.70 
Slovak Rep.             0.03 0.04 0.72 
Slovenia             0.04 0.02 0.54 
Spain 0.02 0.06 0.36 0.13 0.09 0.53 0.12 0.11 0.64 0.12 0.12 0.60 0.12 0.12 0.94 
Sweden 0.04 0.13 0.45 0.08 0.11 0.44 0.06 0.08 0.58 0.12 0.10 0.77 0.10 0.14 0.79 
UK 0.07 0.19 0.48 0.10 0.14 0.48 0.22 0.22 0.70 0.12 0.10 0.56 0.12 0.13 0.74 
a See text for details of calculation.  
Columns (I): based on sector-specific ODA for FNS to individual recipient countries; Columns (II): based on 
total ODA for FNS to individual recipient countries; Columns (III): based on sector-specific ODA for FNS to 
all recipient countries. 
We find that on average for the entire period, Germany, Belgium and France appear to have 
most overlap with the EU Institutions in terms of recipient countries. This is not surprising, 
given the fact that these three donors are amongst the worst cross-country proliferators, which 
increases the likelihood of overlapping activities as the EU itself is far from selective in 
choosing recipient countries as well. Belgium however, appears to have reduced its cross-
country overlap with EU Institutions considerably, even though its selectivity in terms of 
recipient countries has remained limited. This could imply that Belgium and the EU are both 
focusing on a large but increasingly different subset of countries, thus contributing to 
coordination to some extent. Improved coordination in this case however, is unlikely to 
alleviate recipient countries’ problems associated with aid fragmentation. The yearly data 
further reveal that overlap with Luxembourg seems to be experiencing a strong upward trend 
when focussing on the recipient dimension only. The country actually has the largest cross-
country overlap with the EU for the period between 2010 and 2013, even though their total 
budget for aid for food and nutrition security remains limited. Overall, there is no real 
consistent pattern of changes in cross-country overlap over time. While overlap decreased for 
several Member States in the period between 2006 and 2009, this decline persisted into the 
next period for Italy and the Netherlands only.  
Interestingly, we get a somewhat different picture when focussing on cross-sector overlap. 
Although modest improvements have been made recently, Italy stands out with a very high 
degree of overlap with the EU for the entire period. Moreover, there actually appears to be a 
strong upward trend in the similarities between EU and Member States sectoral composition 
of aid for food and nutrition security, especially after the global food price crisis. Similar to 
what we found for proliferation, improvement in overlap between the EU and Member States 
19 
 
most likely stem from changes in terms of focussing on a different or complimentary subset of 
recipient countries rather than sectors. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
The global food price crisis renewed interest in food and nutrition security and generated a 
significant increase in donor funding for it. In this context, the need for improved 
coordination and complementarity of funding is high as it is widely assumed that the 
effectiveness of aid is severely hampered by donor proliferation, aid fragmentation and lack 
of coordination. This paper investigates the coherence and coordination of European Union 
(EU) development policies aimed at enhancing food and nutrition security. We find that the 
EU has shown great political commitment towards enhancing the coordination of 
development policies. The in 2007 adopted Code of Conduct on Complementarity and 
Division of Labour in particular is considered as “the most demanding normative framework 
on Division of Labour so far” (Burcky, 2011). In addition, the EU Policy Framework to assist 
developing countries in addressing food security challenges specifically refers to this Code of 
Conduct and clearly specifies that tasks should be divided based on comparative advantage 
and actions should be coordinated.   
When quantitatively assessing whether EU aid for food and nutrition security has become less 
proliferated over time -by concentrating in selected recipient countries and/or by specialising 
in selected aid sectors- however, we find that progress has been limited. In addition, the 
enlargement of the EU has prompted the establishment of several new donors, who are still 
expanding their portfolios and therefore increasingly proliferating. This seems to suggest that 
though the adoption of the Code of Conduct in 2007 appears to have set in motion a 
downward trend the proliferation of aid for food and nutrition security, the implementation 
has been relatively slow. Our results further indicate that most progress in terms of selectivity 
has been made through a reduction in the number of recipient countries rather than sectors.  
Even less favourable conclusions emerge from our analysis of the overlap between EU 
Institutions’ and Member States’ aid activities. Overall, we find no evidence of a clear 
downward sloping trend. On the contrary, it appears that overlap with the EU Institutions in 
fact peaked in the aftermath of the global food price crisis and has been on the rise again since 
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2012, especially in terms of the sectoral composition of the aid budget, giving rise to the idea 
that the increasing attention and funding for food and nutrition security goes hand in hand 
with more overlapping aid activities and therefore perhaps the duplication of efforts. 
However, more in-depth research on the latter is advisable. 
In sum, while political commitment to improving the coordination and complementarity of aid 
in general and aid for food and nutrition security in particular appears to be strong, our 
quantitative analysis reveals that in reality progress has limited and slow and there is still 
significant room for improvement.   
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Appendix A: Disbursements 
Table A1: Concentration Indexa ODA for FNS Disbursements 
 2002-2005 2006-2009 2010-2013 
 I II III I II III I II III 
Austria 3.57 2.93 1.26 3.43 2.87 1.30 3.13 2.94 1.12 
Belgium 4.37 3.62 1.20 4.11 3.41 1.11 3.13 3.19 1.07 
Czech Republic       1.80 2.24 0.66 
Denmark 2.62 2.73 1.17 3.23 2.62 1.34 2.80 2.96 1.14 
Estonia       0.37 0.15 0.00 
Finland 1.86 2.58 1.21 2.93 2.57 1.12 2.43 2.84 1.17 
France 4.18 3.61 1.01 4.17 3.59 0.93 3.45 3.42 0.99 
Germany 4.89 4.05 1.33 4.65 3.94 1.41 3.41 3.77 1.35 
Greece 3.41 2.91 1.18 3.11 2.74 1.39 1.34 1.51 0.15 
Ireland 3.96 3.04 1.39 3.38 2.90 1.39 2.74 2.80 1.31 
Italy 4.38 3.92 1.29 4.57 3.98 1.45 3.92 3.74 1.43 
Luxembourg 2.57 2.80 1.46 3.71 3.05 1.58 2.50 2.83 1.48 
Netherlands 3.80 3.17 1.36 3.70 3.18 1.26 2.52 2.90 1.23 
Poland       0.60 1.75 0.95 
Portugal 2.16 1.60 0.58 2.08 1.43 0.78 2.18 1.79 1.21 
Slovak Republic       0.61 1.06 0.67 
Slovenia       1.23 1.54 1.07 
Spain 4.64 3.44 1.61 4.61 3.60 1.63 3.42 3.59 1.32 
Sweden 3.35 2.91 1.27 3.48 3.08 1.28 3.05 3.04 1.24 
United Kingdom 3.85 3.00 1.54 3.27 2.70 1.50 2.23 2.79 1.58 
           
EU Institutions 4.30 3.74 1.44 4.80 4.18 1.44 4.16 4.21 1.52 
a See text for details of calculation. Columns (I): based on sector-specific ODA 
for FNS to individual recipient countries; Columns (II): based on total ODA for 
FNS to individual recipient countries; Columns (III): based on sector-specific 
ODA for FNS to all recipient countries. 
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Table A2: Overlap Indexa ODA for FNS Disbursements 
 2002-2005 2006-2009 2010-2013 
 I II III I II III I II III 
Austria 0.13 0.29 0.60 0.17 0.31 0.67 0.13 0.25 0.70 
Belgium 0.25 0.41 0.71 0.21 0.37 0.64 0.18 0.38 0.72 
Czech Republic       0.06 0.16 0.58 
Denmark 0.09 0.20 0.52 0.14 0.29 0.59 0.18 0.39 0.73 
Estonia       0.01 0.01 0.41 
Finland 0.04 0.18 0.64 0.11 0.31 0.53 0.09 0.26 0.71 
France 0.25 0.46 0.67 0.23 0.36 0.61 0.23 0.41 0.70 
Germany 0.25 0.41 0.70 0.25 0.49 0.72 0.26 0.51 0.81 
Greece 0.07 0.17 0.62 0.11 0.19 0.67 0.02 0.08 0.45 
Ireland 0.14 0.27 0.71 0.20 0.38 0.73 0.19 0.32 0.82 
Italy 0.15 0.33 0.78 0.29 0.47 0.93 0.25 0.47 0.82 
Luxembourg 0.14 0.35 0.78 0.13 0.25 0.70 0.14 0.28 0.72 
Netherlands 0.14 0.26 0.68 0.20 0.37 0.63 0.16 0.33 0.74 
Poland       0.02 0.07 0.67 
Portugal 0.06 0.09 0.51 0.04 0.07 0.60 0.03 0.06 0.66 
Slovak Republic       0.03 0.09 0.50 
Slovenia       0.04 0.16 0.51 
Spain 0.15 0.27 0.77 0.23 0.37 0.64 0.17 0.36 0.78 
Sweden 0.06 0.17 0.70 0.19 0.34 0.68 0.17 0.34 0.74 
United Kingdom 0.12 0.21 0.86 0.21 0.39 0.72 0.18 0.35 0.78 
a See text for details of calculation. Columns (I): based on sector-specific 
ODA for FNS to individual recipient countries; Columns (II): based on total 
ODA for FNS to individual recipient countries; Columns (III): based on 
sector-specific ODA for FNS to all recipient countries. 
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Appendix B: Yearly changes 
Table B1: Concentration Indexa,1 ODA for FNS Commitments 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Austria 
 
3.33 2.76 2.96 2.69 2.97 3.11 3.04 2.85 2.95 3.04 2.69 3.35 2.49 2.78 3.36 2.79 2.57 3.15 
Belgium 4.11 3.85 4.15 4.1 3.9 3.9 3.82 3.99 4.17 3.66 3.71 3.85 3.55 3.46 3.61 3.59 3.37 3.73 3.18 
Czech Republic                 2.42 2.49 2.55 
Denmark 2.82 2.55 1.98 2.08 1.48 2.19 2.52 1.61 2.12 2.55 2.29 1.67 1.46 0.98 2.04 2.37 2.43 1.94 1.71 
Estonia                   0.05 
Finland 1.66 1.76 1.81 2.12 1.95 1.84 2.57 1.43 1.91 2.08 2.21 2.28 2.11 2.28 2.71 2.37 2.63 2.82 3.09 
France 3.04 2.85 3.29 2.94 3.11 3.31 3.27 3.84 3.4 3.63 2.71 3.37 3.54 3.66 3.48 3.57 3.46 3.65 3.35 
Germany 3.02 2.92 3.4 3.14 4.05 4.15 4 4.13 4.18 3.98 4.19 3.6 4.32 4.03 4.11 3.82 3.93 3.67 3.9 
Greece        2.25 2.52 2.95 2.71 2.17 1.62 3.07 2.27 1.22 0 0 
 Ireland      3.2 3.16 3.5 3.67 3.51 3.7 3.45 3.33 3.4 3.54 3.24 3.41 3.37 3.22 
Italy 2.84 3.15 2.36 3.35 3.81 3.42 3.68 3.5 3.57 3.27 2.76 3.7 3.85 3.96 2.61 3.96 2.6 2.72 3.33 
Luxembourg       0.96 0.76 1.1 2.57 2.66 3.43 3.63 3.34 3.31 3.03 3.32 3.16 3.14 
Netherlands 3.57 3.77 3.14 4.01 3.6 3.14 3.48 3.25 2.57 2.49 2.62 2.87 2.69 2.69 2.71 2.48 2.28 2.89 2.89 
Poland                   2.19 
Portugal 
 
0.43 0 0.64 1.91 1.56 1.27 1.75 2.02 2 1.97 1.53 2.02 1.85 1.97 2.35 2.34 2.3 2.46 
Slovak Republic                   1.21 
Slovenia                1.62 1.42 0.55 0.88 
Spain 0 0.43 3.27 4.01 4.22 3.19 3.92 4.07 3.71 4.32 4.43 4.69 4.6 4.72 3.72 4.37 4.25 4.2 3.36 
Sweden 1.93 1.31 2.42 2.32 1.85 2.29 2.75 2.06 1.92 1.57 2.8 2.28 2.4 2.67 2.77 2.76 1.79 1.59 2.53 
United Kingdom 3.3 2.87 3.04 3.18 2.56 3.26 3.04 2.57 3.18 2.76 2.85 2.28 2.47 2.19 2.33 2.14 3.02 2.92 3.36 
                    EU 3.78 3.88 3.54 3.81 3.8 3.88 3.94 3.66 3.82 3.6 3.77 3.72 3.79 3.33 3.74 3.21 2.88 3.9 3.93 
a See text for details of calculation. 
1 Based on sector-specific ODA for FNS to individual recipient countries. 
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Table B2: Concentration Indexa,1 ODA for FNS Commitments (recipient only) 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Austria 
 
2.87 2.63 2.52 2.39 2.55 2.65 2.71 2.43 2.75 2.67 2.41 2.95 2.22 2.53 2.91 2.53 2.34 2.74 
Belgium 3.72 3.4 3.66 3.64 3.49 3.59 3.24 3.46 3.5 3.11 3.17 3.24 3.07 2.86 3.09 3.12 2.87 3.15 2.72 
Czech Republic                 2.08 2.14 1.14 
Denmark 2.58 2.14 1.87 2 1.46 2.07 2.32 1.51 1.73 2.21 2.23 1.26 1.32 0.97 1.99 2.16 2.26 1.83 1.43 
Estonia                   0.52 
Finland 1.46 1.76 1.61 1.85 1.74 1.44 2.23 1.36 1.62 2.01 2.09 2.11 1.86 2.17 2.41 2.11 2.36 2.64 2.75 
France 2.68 2.55 2.88 2.63 2.8 2.99 3.04 3.54 3.19 3.32 2.65 3.03 3.37 3.37 3.12 3.17 2.97 3.12 3.08 
Germany 2.66 2.82 3.19 2.9 3.43 3.62 3.58 3.66 3.66 3.53 3.71 3.23 3.79 3.45 3.59 3.44 3.36 3.21 3.35 
Greece        2.25 2.15 2.6 2.55 1.66 1.51 2.87 2.27 1.22 0 0 
 Ireland      2.49 2.53 2.81 2.93 2.77 2.9 2.81 2.62 2.68 2.89 2.62 2.81 2.74 2.64 
Italy 2.78 2.94 2.18 3.25 3.42 3.11 3.42 3.21 3.29 3.1 2.66 3.45 3.4 3.57 2.38 3.45 2.37 2.44 3.16 
Luxembourg       0.96 0.76 1.1 2.51 2.4 2.87 2.93 2.74 2.88 2.61 2.75 2.63 2.59 
Netherlands 3.19 3.24 2.86 3.41 3.2 2.79 3.07 2.82 2.19 2.36 2.48 2.67 2.43 2.4 2.39 2.2 1.82 2.39 2.34 
Poland                   1.75 
Portugal 
 
0.43 0 0.64 1.23 1.38 1.09 1.37 1.75 1.43 1.57 1.35 1.39 1.37 1.43 1.69 1.58 1.72 1.85 
Slovak Republic                   1.17 
Slovenia                1.56 1.25 0.53 0.88 
Spain 0 0.43 2.59 3.17 3.22 2.53 3.1 3.15 2.99 3.28 3.36 3.5 3.55 3.53 3.03 3.44 3.43 3.36 2.82 
Sweden 1.81 0.93 1.88 2.1 1.65 1.85 2.64 2.01 1.83 1.57 2.73 2.21 2.22 2.57 2.56 2.41 1.76 1.17 2.38 
United Kingdom 2.97 2.53 2.64 2.69 2.11 2.5 2.77 2.41 2.88 2.5 2.58 2.11 2.05 1.95 2.01 2 2.67 2.63 2.82 
  
                   EU 3.43 3.66 3.47 3.51 3.52 3.63 3.63 3.52 3.63 3.29 3.47 3.55 3.48 3.15 3.45 3.09 2.74 3.61 3.49 
a See text for details of calculation. 
1 Based on total ODA for FNS to individual recipient countries. 
 
  
29 
 
Table B3: Concentration Indexa,1 ODA for FNS Commitments (sector only) 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Austria 
 
1.29 1.17 1.27 1.29 1.15 1.26 1.21 1.25 1.24 1.19 1.24 1.23 1.13 1.46 0.99 1.07 0.82 0.88 
Belgium 0.68 0.93 1.24 0.95 0.91 1.07 1.41 1.21 1.28 0.82 1.13 1.17 1.15 0.98 0.96 0.9 0.94 0.79 0.77 
Czech Republic                 0.53 0.66 0.78 
Denmark 1.58 1.24 0.4 1.07 0.16 0.86 0.75 0.53 1.19 1.02 1.21 1.22 0.79 0.95 1.24 1.01 0.85 0.74 0.51 
Estonia                   0 
Finland 1.09 0.53 0.74 1.02 1.29 0.98 1.11 1 0.99 0.81 1.09 0.96 0.94 1.23 1.16 0.94 1.4 1.12 1.26 
France 1.19 0.99 1.36 0.78 0.71 0.84 0.58 1.17 1.19 1.12 0.89 0.98 0.53 0.67 0.89 1.15 1.17 1.05 0.98 
Germany 1.2 1.09 0.91 1.17 1.28 1.28 1.32 1.29 1.43 1.1 1.27 1.16 1.5 1.35 1.31 1.22 1.31 1.39 1.28 
Greece        0.74 0.61 1.02 1.13 1.26 1.05 1.03 0.02 0.14 0 0 
 Ireland      1.23 1.11 1.17 1.21 1.23 1.42 1.32 1.4 1.44 1.19 1.16 1.12 1.39 1.39 
Italy 1.1 0.89 0.56 1.22 1.12 0.93 0.73 1.27 1.54 1.17 0.78 0.8 1.4 1.27 0.87 1.2 1.31 0.99 0.99 
Luxembourg       0.43 0.29 0.65 1.15 1.18 1.44 1.68 1.44 1.38 1.43 1.49 1.4 1.43 
Netherlands 1.21 1.35 1.28 1.39 1.45 1.32 1.39 1.3 0.95 1.17 1.09 0.9 0.99 1.25 1.24 1.27 1.24 0.97 1.33 
Poland                   0.95 
Portugal 
 
0.43 0 0.64 1.07 0.19 0.22 0.4 0.36 0.66 0.83 0.84 0.88 0.56 0.73 1.15 1.09 1 1.23 
Slovak Republic                   0.5 
Slovenia                1.18 0.93 0.4 0.75 
Spain 0 0 1.58 1.65 1.51 1.41 1.44 1.7 1.35 1.59 1.55 1.72 1.78 1.64 1.37 1.23 1.51 1.53 1.12 
Sweden 0.72 1.06 1.15 1.15 1.03 1.39 1.2 0.99 1.2 0.87 1.19 1.13 0.63 1.2 1.14 1.35 0.96 0.84 0.65 
United Kingdom 1.36 0.87 1.17 1.56 1.34 1.39 1.36 1.31 1.08 1.28 1.25 1.13 1.33 1.23 1.29 1.45 1.47 1.12 1.57 
  
                   EU Institutions 1.3 1.05 0.79 1.16 1.12 1.18 1.28 1.04 1.53 1.42 1.45 1.4 1.36 0.9 1.11 1.34 0.77 1.25 1.39 
a See text for details of calculation. 
1 Based on sector-specific ODA for FNS to all recipient countries. 
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Table B4: Concentration Indexa,1 ODA for FNS Disbursements 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Austria 3.29 3.29 3.26 3.36 2.69 3.44 3.23 3.19 3.32 3.33 2.94 3.29 
Belgium 4.02 4.16 4.16 3.94 3.85 3.92 3.99 3.89 3.96 3.89 3.79 3.67 
Czech Republic 
         
2.42 2.49 2.55 
Denmark 
 
2.82 2.99 3.14 1.67 3.18 3.12 3.30 3.41 3.43 3.30 3.01 
Estonia 
           
0.08 
Finland 2.60 2.92 
  
2.28 2.79 2.92 2.97 3.04 3.24 3.19 2.94 
France 3.98 3.97 3.96 3.80 3.37 3.80 4.17 4.08 4.20 3.77 3.86 3.87 
Germany 4.19 4.81 4.86 4.82 3.60 4.88 4.71 4.66 4.54 4.22 4.38 4.22 
Greece 2.25 2.52 2.95 2.71 2.17 1.62 3.07 2.27 1.22 0.00 0.00 
 Ireland 3.50 3.67 3.51 3.70 3.45 3.33 3.40 3.54 3.24 3.41 3.37 3.22 
Italy 3.46 3.28 3.71 2.74 3.70 4.33 4.07 3.84 4.19 4.21 4.02 3.32 
Luxembourg 
 
1.36 2.57 2.66 3.43 3.63 3.34 3.31 3.03 3.32 3.16 3.14 
Netherlands 4.10 3.22 3.30 3.40 2.87 3.41 3.49 3.39 3.09 3.26 3.37 3.45 
Poland 
           
2.19 
Portugal 1.75 2.02 2.00 1.98 1.53 2.02 1.85 1.97 2.35 2.34 2.30 2.46 
Slovak Republic 
           
1.08 
Slovenia 
        
1.80 1.68 0.75 0.85 
Spain 4.47 4.20 4.18 4.43 4.69 4.72 5.00 3.90 4.51 4.59 4.37 3.81 
Sweden 3.18 3.03 3.03 2.87 2.28 3.61 3.42 3.53 3.25 3.31 3.21 3.06 
UK 3.51 3.47 3.70 3.29 2.28 3.43 3.22 3.04 2.99 3.14 3.15 3.39 
  
            EU 3.32 3.65 3.16 4.30 3.72 4.69 4.64 4.82 4.71 4.77 4.83 4.83 
a See text for details of calculation. 
1 Based on sector-specific ODA for FNS to individual recipient countries. 
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Table B5: Concentration Indexa,1 ODA for FNS Disbursements (recipient only) 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Austria 2.85 2.77 2.81 2.78 2.76 2.89 2.79 2.64 2.78 2.84 2.51 2.86 
Belgium 3.56 3.50 3.49 3.37 3.35 3.34 3.29 3.23 3.30 3.14 3.08 3.06 
Czech Republic          2.08 2.15 2.19 
Denmark  2.46 2.59 2.66 2.80 2.67 2.44 2.77 2.86 2.87 2.89 2.64 
Estonia           0.00 0.08 
Finland 2.34 2.50   2.19 2.32 2.52 2.60 2.62 2.87 2.84 2.60 
France 3.55 3.54 3.54 3.30 3.29 3.50 3.60 3.45 3.51 3.18 3.24 3.36 
Germany 3.62 4.03 4.04 4.03 4.00 4.05 3.99 3.89 3.83 3.60 3.64 3.51 
Greece 2.25 2.15 2.60 2.55 1.66 1.51 2.87 2.27 1.22 0.00 0.00  
Ireland 3.39 3.88 3.76 3.78 3.80 3.59 3.57 3.40 3.27 3.25 3.29 3.21 
Italy 3.43 3.06 3.51 2.67 3.25 3.75 3.71 3.49 3.69 3.64 3.48 2.96 
Luxembourg  1.36 2.51 2.40 2.87 2.93 2.74 2.88 2.61 2.75 2.63 2.59 
Netherlands 3.42 2.75 2.89 2.90 3.03 3.00 2.93 2.94 2.79 2.71 2.62 2.74 
Poland            1.75 
Portugal 1.37 1.75 1.43 1.57 1.35 1.39 1.37 1.43 1.69 1.58 1.72 1.85 
Slovak Republic            1.06 
Slovenia         1.78 1.50 0.50 0.85 
Spain 3.32 3.28 3.32 3.36 3.55 3.58 3.64 3.14 3.49 3.64 3.42 3.11 
Sweden 2.82 2.81 2.81 2.54 2.94 3.17 3.05 3.12 2.91 3.00 2.77 2.63 
UK 2.90 2.81 2.87 2.66 2.64 2.79 2.60 2.49 2.51 2.52 2.70 2.76 
              
EU 3.06 3.30 2.98 3.88 4.05 4.11 4.09 4.16 4.04 4.02 4.10 4.11 
a See text for details of calculation. 
1 Based on total ODA for FNS to individual recipient countries. 
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Table B6: Concentration Indexa,1 ODA for FNS Disbursements (sector only) 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Austria 1.07 1.30 1.17 1.28 1.19 1.29 1.15 1.42 1.23 1.12 1.08 0.85 
Belgium 1.10 1.28 1.17 1.07 1.21 1.12 1.05 1.01 1.15 1.17 1.04 0.79 
Czech Republic          0.53 0.66 0.78 
Denmark  1.02 1.16 1.24 1.22 1.07 1.14 1.54 1.23 1.10 1.10 1.02 
Estonia            0.00 
Finland 0.99 1.14   1.03 1.09 1.12 1.15 1.11 1.20 1.22 1.11 
France 0.87 1.09 1.00 0.80 1.12 0.66 0.95 1.06 0.96 0.89 1.10 0.94 
Germany 1.21 1.36 1.35 1.31 1.32 1.51 1.36 1.36 1.30 1.28 1.38 1.33 
Greece 0.74 0.61 1.02 1.13 1.26 1.05 1.03 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.00  
Ireland 1.17 1.21 1.23 1.42 1.32 1.40 1.44 1.19 1.16 1.12 1.39 1.39 
Italy 0.15 0.94 1.26 0.96 1.32 1.61 1.21 1.37 1.36 1.44 1.43 1.28 
Luxembourg  0.00 1.15 1.18 1.44 1.68 1.44 1.38 1.43 1.49 1.40 1.43 
Netherlands 1.28 1.40 1.23 1.28 1.23 1.07 1.27 1.30 1.34 1.18 1.13 1.18 
Poland            0.95 
Portugal 0.40 0.36 0.66 0.83 0.84 0.88 0.56 0.73 1.15 1.09 1.00 1.28 
Slovak Republic            0.67 
Slovenia         1.19 1.03 0.60 0.72 
Spain 1.71 1.60 1.55 1.55 1.71 1.76 1.59 1.45 1.16 1.44 1.52 1.40 
Sweden 1.19 1.17 1.21 1.28 1.22 1.23 1.29 1.29 1.26 1.16 1.13 1.24 
UK 1.41 1.52 1.50 1.58 1.32 1.49 1.47 1.38 1.55 1.58 1.53 1.59 
              
EU 1.09 1.13 1.12 1.35 1.42 1.40 1.44 1.36 1.45 1.53 1.52 1.50 
a See text for details of calculation. 
1 Based on sector-specific ODA for FNS to all recipient countries. 
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Table B7: OverlapIndexa,1 ODA for FNS Commitments 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Austria  0.09 0.02 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.10 
Belgium 0.09 0.18 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.10 0.15 
Czech Republic                 0.01 0.11 0.03 
Denmark 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.09 
Estonia                   0.00 
Finland 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.06 
France 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.05 0.11 0.14 0.15 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.08 0.15 0.04 0.05 0.16 0.15 
Germany 0.15 0.14 0.10 0.09 0.16 0.12 0.13 0.08 0.15 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.22 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.13 
Greece        0.00 0.03 0.00 0.14 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Ireland      0.10 0.08 0.04 0.10 0.11 0.26 0.16 0.05 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.08 0.10 0.10 
Italy 0.15 0.25 0.02 0.16 0.20 0.12 0.19 0.16 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.06 0.10 0.11 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.13 
Luxembourg       0.01 0.00 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.10 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.06 
Netherlands 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.16 0.16 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.11 
Poland                   0.03 
Portugal  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01 
Slovak Republic                   0.04 
Slovenia                0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01 
Spain 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.15 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.09 
Sweden 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.06 
United Kingdom 0.23 0.02 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.17 0.20 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.07 0.08 
a See text for details of calculation. 
1 Based on sector-specific ODA for FNS to individual recipient countries. 
 
  
34 
 
 
Table B8: Overlap Indexa,1 ODA for FNS Commitments (recipient only) 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Austria  0.09 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.16 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.16 0.12 0.02 0.19 0.17 
Belgium 0.17 0.19 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.22 0.13 0.19 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.05 0.15 0.16 
Czech Republic                 0.01 0.04 0.02 
Denmark 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.08 0.04 0.18 0.10 
Estonia                   0.00 
Finland 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.10 
France 0.17 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.10 0.10 0.03 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.16 0.12 
Germany 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.11 0.15 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.12 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.22 
Greece 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.15 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Ireland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.19 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.05 0.11 0.10 
Italy 0.11 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.13 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.14 0.12 
Luxembourg       0.02 0.10 0.03 0.15 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.16 0.13 0.30 0.15 0.22 0.20 
Netherlands 0.09 0.16 0.05 0.16 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.14 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.11 0.07 
Poland                   0.04 
Portugal 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.05 
Slovak Republic                   0.00 
Slovenia                0.00 0.00 0.04 0.02 
Spain 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.13 0.06 
Sweden 0.15 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.27 0.00 0.04 0.06 
United Kingdom 0.17 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.16 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.14 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.14 
a See text for details of calculation. 
1 Based on total ODA for FNS to individual recipient countries. 
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Table B9: Overlap Indexa,1 ODA for FNS Commitments (sector only) 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Austria  0.49 0.44 0.53 0.55 0.54 0.50 0.43 0.70 0.63 0.45 0.64 0.67 0.47 0.47 0.72 0.80 0.74 0.69 
Belgium 0.47 0.41 0.27 0.44 0.32 0.53 0.48 0.42 0.68 0.48 0.48 0.63 0.63 0.68 0.83 0.71 0.93 0.76 0.64 
Czech Republic                 0.89 0.75 0.60 
Denmark 0.49 0.24 0.09 0.20 0.30 0.29 0.24 0.17 0.42 0.39 0.50 0.38 0.50 0.39 0.65 0.73 0.87 0.78 0.53 
Estonia                   0.41 
Finland 0.54 0.28 0.08 0.45 0.50 0.31 0.32 0.20 0.56 0.54 0.45 0.44 0.59 0.39 0.61 0.81 0.54 0.89 0.76 
France 0.53 0.42 0.31 0.35 0.33 0.40 0.28 0.50 0.69 0.57 0.44 0.61 0.51 0.77 0.88 0.83 0.76 0.81 0.70 
Germany 0.70 0.48 0.25 0.34 0.61 0.50 0.38 0.38 0.80 0.52 0.50 0.64 0.68 0.56 0.76 0.81 0.54 0.75 0.85 
Greece        0.16 0.47 0.38 0.81 0.42 0.59 0.50 0.67 0.58 0.79 0.09  
Ireland      0.51 0.37 0.28 0.70 0.58 0.82 0.68 0.78 0.65 0.81 0.86 0.71 0.75 0.71 
Italy 0.73 0.81 0.11 0.68 0.80 0.72 0.79 0.57 0.76 0.51 0.40 0.57 0.70 0.71 0.91 0.88 0.58 0.79 0.68 
Luxembourg       0.24 0.29 0.48 0.60 0.48 0.74 0.67 0.57 0.51 0.63 0.52 0.76 0.92 
Netherlands 0.71 0.45 0.31 0.49 0.51 0.43 0.45 0.36 0.48 0.63 0.48 0.47 0.39 0.54 0.82 0.71 0.58 0.82 0.80 
Poland                   0.70 
Portugal 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.16 0.36 0.24 0.21 0.23 0.32 0.41 0.37 0.55 0.59 0.71 0.80 0.76 0.61 0.56 0.63 
Slovak Republic                   0.59 
Slovenia                0.73 0.58 0.32 0.42 
Spain 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.50 0.63 0.48 0.45 0.40 0.59 0.73 0.58 0.79 0.67 0.40 0.48 0.88 0.57 0.72 0.68 
Sweden 0.48 0.42 0.30 0.27 0.46 0.44 0.36 0.35 0.56 0.56 0.50 0.55 0.56 0.67 0.67 0.80 0.77 0.85 0.56 
United Kingdom 0.83 0.33 0.25 0.43 0.52 0.46 0.45 0.54 0.65 0.74 0.64 0.64 0.46 0.64 0.40 0.63 0.54 0.89 0.69 
a See text for details of calculation. 
1 Based on sector-specific ODA for FNS to all recipient countries. 
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Table B10: Disbursements on Indexa,1 ODA for FNS Disbursements 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Austria 0.12 0.12 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.16 
Belgium 0.13 0.14 0.20 0.14 0.09 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.22 0.17 0.17 0.16 
Czech Republic          0.05 0.06 0.08 
Denmark  0.09 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.09 0.12 0.17 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.15 
Estonia            0.02 
Finland 0.02 0.04   0.03 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.11 
France 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.14 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.22 0.23 0.19 
Germany 0.10 0.14 0.14 0.22 0.06 0.26 0.25 0.29 0.26 0.23 0.26 0.26 
Greece 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.01  
Ireland 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.22 0.16 0.14 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.19 0.16 0.19 
Italy 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.19 0.22 0.17 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.17 
Luxembourg  0.00 0.19 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.14 0.15 0.11 0.09 
Netherlands 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.09 0.01 0.13 0.20 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.20 
Poland            0.04 
Portugal 0.08 0.01 0.11 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Slovak Republic            0.04 
Slovenia         0.02 0.05 0.01 0.01 
Spain 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.20 0.11 0.21 0.20 0.15 0.20 0.20 0.16 0.12 
Sweden 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.12 0.17 0.20 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.13 
UK 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.23 0.12 0.19 0.19 0.08 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.16 
a See text for details of calculation. 
1 Based on sector-specific ODA for FNS to individual recipient countries. 
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Table B11: Overlap Indexa,1 ODA for FNS Disbursements (recipient only) 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Austria 0.21 0.20 0.13 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.30 0.22 0.23 0.20 0.20 0.26 
Belgium 0.23 0.31 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.44 0.33 0.32 0.30 
Czech Republic          0.13 0.13 0.16 
Denmark  0.17 0.12 0.16 0.29 0.26 0.28 0.31 0.39 0.36 0.38 0.24 
Estonia            0.02 
Finland 0.09 0.16   0.26 0.27 0.30 0.23 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.27 
France 0.32 0.35 0.31 0.27 0.34 0.28 0.37 0.41 0.40 0.37 0.35 0.32 
Germany 0.26 0.28 0.27 0.43 0.49 0.49 0.47 0.54 0.45 0.45 0.50 0.44 
Greece 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.28 0.14 0.08 0.18 0.11 0.03 0.00 0.04  
Ireland 0.14 0.17 0.22 0.37 0.35 0.40 0.41 0.37 0.34 0.30 0.33 0.32 
Italy 0.23 0.13 0.18 0.21 0.29 0.41 0.37 0.43 0.41 0.36 0.42 0.30 
Luxembourg  0.09 0.27 0.16 0.27 0.26 0.21 0.22 0.25 0.23 0.26 0.22 
Netherlands 0.17 0.11 0.18 0.20 0.30 0.31 0.35 0.37 0.31 0.26 0.24 0.29 
Poland            0.08 
Portugal 0.10 0.04 0.13 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.06 
Slovak Republic            0.09 
Slovenia         0.14 0.10 0.03 0.04 
Spain 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.32 0.41 0.37 0.35 0.30 0.34 0.34 0.31 0.26 
Sweden 0.08 0.13 0.06 0.21 0.28 0.31 0.32 0.29 0.26 0.29 0.29 0.27 
UK 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.32 0.22 0.32 0.37 0.32 0.30 0.30 0.25 0.30 
a See text for details of calculation. 
1 Based on total ODA for FNS to individual recipient countries. 
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Table B6: Concentration Indexa,1 ODA for FNS Disbursements (sector only) 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Austria 0.68 0.57 0.47 0.53 0.63 0.65 0.67 0.58 0.59 0.68 0.64 0.66 
Belgium 0.69 0.82 0.90 0.49 0.56 0.63 0.67 0.60 0.67 0.73 0.70 0.66 
Czech Republic          0.58 0.55 0.63 
Denmark  0.79 0.83 0.38 0.45 0.45 0.54 0.66 0.67 0.71 0.72 0.75 
Estonia            0.43 
Finland 0.88 0.51   0.51 0.57 0.57 0.50 0.62 0.66 0.71 0.79 
France 0.64 0.78 0.75 0.40 0.55 0.47 0.65 0.70 0.67 0.70 0.73 0.68 
Germany 0.73 0.63 0.65 0.54 0.66 0.75 0.72 0.66 0.71 0.76 0.87 0.87 
Greece 0.61 0.65 0.70 0.85 0.40 0.47 0.57 0.44 0.43 0.45 0.25  
Ireland 0.60 0.74 0.80 0.76 0.60 0.74 0.78 0.67 0.69 0.81 0.82 0.84 
Italy 0.04 0.88 0.48 0.37 0.62 0.80 0.86 0.76 0.77 0.93 0.76 0.73 
Luxembourg  0.02 0.67 0.46 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.54 0.56 0.68 0.76 0.86 
Netherlands 0.87 0.71 0.85 0.47 0.52 0.52 0.69 0.68 0.70 0.62 0.69 0.78 
Poland            0.74 
Portugal 0.61 0.68 0.75 0.48 0.59 0.55 0.56 0.57 0.66 0.66 0.59 0.53 
Slovak Republic            0.51 
Slovenia         0.52 0.65 0.32 0.42 
Spain 0.67 0.76 0.80 0.60 0.74 0.72 0.56 0.63 0.68 0.77 0.82 0.76 
Sweden 0.84 0.63 0.71 0.62 0.60 0.69 0.76 0.63 0.72 0.74 0.70 0.78 
UK 0.74 0.65 0.70 0.81 0.86 0.75 0.78 0.51 0.72 0.73 0.86 0.83 
a See text for details of calculation. 
1 Based on sector-specific ODA for FNS to all recipient countries. 
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